“Winning a seat at the table: Strategic routes by emerging powers to gain privileges in exclusive formal clubs” was published by the journal Contemporary Security Policy and authored by one of our esteemed non-resident scholars, Deganit Paikowsky. 

“Winning a seat at the table: Strategic routes by emerging powers to gain privileges in exclusive formal clubs” was published by the journal Contemporary Security Policy and authored by one of our esteemed non-resident scholars, Deganit Paikowsky. 

In this article, we focus on emerging powers that aspire to enjoy privileges enjoyed by established powers. These privileges vary in their level of institutionalization: full formal privileges, partial formal privileges, and informal privileges. We identify two alternative strategic routes through which emerging powers target these three types of privileges: a top-down and a bottom-up routes. We analyze two factors that impact the choice between these two routes: restrictiveness of eligibility criteria for winning privileges, and the expected levels of opposition by both established powers and outsiders. We examine the impact of these factors on two cases in which India negotiated privileges: India’s top-down campaign to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and India’s bottom-up campaign to enter the nuclear club as a de facto nuclear weapon state. Highly restrictive eligibility criteria along with high levels of opposition drove India to gradually seek nuclear privileges through a bottom-up route.

It can be found here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13523260.2022.2074116

Makusu Tsuizaki authors article published by The Space Review. (Part 2 now available)

Visiting scholar in The George Washington University Space Policy Institute, Makusu Tsuizaki, has his article published in The Space Review. Raising the flag on the Moon and Mars: future human space exploration in Japan (part 1)/4377/1

 

“Countering Threats in Space Through International Cooperation”

Recent SPI graduate Gentoku Toyoma wrote the article “Countering Threats in Space Through International Cooperation“, which was published in Space Policy, Volume 55, February 2021.

Abstract:

The U.S. military’s dependence on inherently vulnerable space assets creates an incentive for its adversaries to target U.S. space systems. Establishing mission assurance through resilience and reconstitution is a critical challenge for the United States. One of the U.S. approaches to strengthening resilience and reconstituting space systems is to engage in international cooperation with its allies. Such cooperation can effectively improve three elements of resilience: disaggregation, distribution, and diversification. International joint development of satellites with allies would also improve the reconstitution of U.S. space systems, which involves rebuilding these systems after damage by adversaries. These efforts could benefit both the United States and its allies through imposing quantitative and political costs on adversaries for attacking U.S. space systems. Several issues prevent close cooperation. Considering these benefits and obstacles, establishing space systems, especially an SSA(Space Situational Awareness) satellite constellation, with allies could be an effective undertaking for the United States. The United States has an advantage compared with its adversaries as it possesses a number of strong allies and partners; thus, the United States should maximize this advantage to improve the resilience and reconstitution of space systems.

“Space Power and the Trajectory of U.S. Influence in Space”

Recent graduate Takuya Wakimoto wrote the article “Space Power and Trajectory of U.S. Influence in Space”, which was recently published in GWU’s International Affairs Review. His article begins on page 39 of the Summer 2019 issue.

 

Abstract:

The United States has utilized the space domain to enhance national security and to improve national prestige. However, a growing number of governmental and commercial participants in the space domain are creating complications and increasing risks such as collisions with space objects or debris. This trend pressures the United States to find ways to protect and preserve its valuable assets in space. It is, therefore, necessary for the U.S. to acquire capabilities to manage and control the space domain. Historically, control of a domain was pursued through military capabilities such as sea, air, or land powers; however, space power is yet an undefined concept. This article explores the historical development of space technologies in the context of national security, how we should approach the undefined concept of space power, and the policies the U.S. should pursue to advance its interests in space.